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THE EFFECT OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON SERVICE ABROAD OF
JUDICIAL AND EXTRAJUDICIAL DOCUMENTS
IN CIVIL OR COMMERCIAL MATTERS
The Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extra-
judicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters entered into
force on February 10, 1969, having been ratified by three nations:
the United States, Great Britain, and the United Arab Republic.
2
The Convention, a product of the Hague Conference on Private In-
ternational Law, is now being considered by other Hague Conference
member nations, many of which are expected to assent to the Con-
vention.
3
The Convention significantly changes prior United States law
for service of documents abroad, Furthermore, the Convention is
an example of an effort to improve and clarify private international
law through a multilateral agreement. Thus, a survey of the effect
of the Convention will be useful both to international lawyers and
students of the development of international law.
I
A BRIEF HISTORY
It is highly significant that the United States was.the first
nation to ratify the Convention. Although a creditor and commer-
cial nation might normally be expected to lead in encouraging
international judicial assistance, the United States after the
Second World War was reluctant to become involved'in this field.I
1For the full text of the Convention T.I.A.S. No. 6638; 14
INTIL. & COMP. L.Q. 564 (1965), For the French text see T.I.A.S.
No. 6638.
2T.I.A.S. No. 6638. Nations having signed the Convention but
not yet ratified -- Finland, West Germany,'Israel, The Netherlands,
Belgium, Turkey, Norway, Denmark, Sweden.
3The member nations of the Hague Conference-on Private Inter-
national Law are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
West Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg,
The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, United States, Yugo-
slavia.
41964 U.. S. CONG. & AD. NEWS 3782, 3783.
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While international judicial cooperation was being-ignored by the
United States the problems were mounting. In 1958-it was reported
that:
The problem is procedural.... It relates principally
to the recognition by courts here and abroad of the ser-
vice of process in foreign jurisdictions, proof of for-
eign laws, public and private documents, and the intro-
duction of testimony taken abroad by way of depositions
or letters rogatory. Existing means for serving judicial
documents abroad, securing records or examining wit-
nesses in a foreign territory have been found to be cum-
bersome or insufficient. Lawyers have discovered this
in many parts of the world. It-is all but impossible to
serve a paper without costly intervention of a foreign
attorney. A familiar American procedure of taking tes-
timony of a witness before a notary public under oral
questioning by an attorney is unknown in the laws of
many foreign countries.... Inthose-instances in which
an attorney is successful in obtaining testimony in
accordance with the foreign practices and procedures, he
can never be certain whether such documents will be
acceptable to the Federal and State courts in this
country.5
The primary reason that the United States was reluctant to
become involved in reform was its federal system. Any treaty or
convention ratified by the Federal Government would have its
greatest impact in modifying or overriding state procedural law --
traditionally a very sensitive area. Interestingly, it was this
very characteristic that finally led the Federal Government to
take action, As Lloyd Wright, then President of the American Bar
Association, noted:
With 49 separate procedural jurisdictions-in the U.S.
a unitary approach is the only solution. We can
hardly expect (a foreign government) to look favorably
on a program of separate negotiation with the repre-
sentatives of each of the 48 states and with the rep-
resentatives of the Federal Government. The problems
must be solved through a single unified set of dis-
cussions, the results of vhich will be effective for
all the 49 jurisdictions.
Finally in 1956 the United States Government for the first
time sent an observer delegation to the Hague Conference on
Private International Law. The Hague Conference, in existence
5COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RULES OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE -
ESTABLISHMENT, S, REP. NO. 2392, 85th-Cong.-2d-Sess. (1958);
1958 U.S.C.C. & A.N, 5201, 5202°
6S. REP: NO, 2392, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); 1958 U.S.
C.C. & A.N, 5201, 5206.
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since 1893, is now a permanent institution which meets'every four
years to discuss-and draft conventions affecting international
problems between member nations.7 In 1958 the Federal Government
created a Commission on International Rules of Judicial Procedure
to study and make recommendations-designed to improve cooperation.
8
The Commission's initial project was a general revamping of the
procedural law of the United States. In 1964 it proposed a series
of changes in the United States which would simplify: (1) serving
documents in connection with proceedings before foreign and inter-
national tribunals; (2) obtaining evidence in the United States
in connection with proceedings before foreign and international
tribunals; (3) proving foreign official documents in proceedings
in the United States; (4) obtaining evidence abroad in connection
with proceedings in the United States; (5) subpoenaing witnesses
in foreign countries in connection with proceedings in the United
States; and (6) transmitting letters rogatory between the United
States and foreign or international tribunals.
9
The Commission plainly intended these changes to be unilateral
to set an example of an enlightened and far-sighted policy. It
was hoped that the initiative taken by the'United States in im-
proving her procedures would stimulate foreign countries to sim-
ilarly adjust their procedures.
1 0
On December 30, 1963, the President signed a resolution auth-
orizing the United States to become a full member of the Hague
7After the United States declined an invitation to join
the Hague Conference in 1951, no further official action was
taken until 1956.
8COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RULES OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE -
ESTABLISHMENT, S. REP. NO. 2392, 85th Cong., 2d'Sess. (1958);
1958 U.S.C.C. & A.N.'5201, 5202.
9See Amram, Proposed International Convention-on the Service
of Documents Abroad, 51 A.B.A.J. 650 (1965-).
lOAct of Oct. 3, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-619; 78 Stat. 995
(1963); 1964 U.S.C.C. & A.N. 3783. See Amram, Public Law No.
88-619"of'Oct. 3, 1964, NewDevelqpments in-InternationFaTJudi-
cial Assistance-inothe-United States-of-America, 32 J.B.A.D.C.
2T71965).
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Conference on Private International Law.11 Having demonstrated
a willingness to act on the reforms recommended-by the Commission
and finally becoming a member of an international forum interested
in reform, the United States was in a position to-assert forceful
leadership in the resolution of difficult international procedural
problems.
At the 1964 meeting of the Hague Conference, by coincidence,
one of the topics on the agenda was the subject of Notification
and Transmission of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents 
Abroad.12
Although the United States had not participated-in the-preliminary
drafts, it took the opportunity to exert its new found enthusiasm
for international judicial assistance. The United States'
suggestions had a considerable influence on the-final draft of
the Convention which the United States promptly signed on November
15, 1967.13
Thus, the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and
Extrajudicial Documents became the first judicial assistance con-
vention which the United States has entered. It marks a dra-
matic change in policy toward cooperation with foreign judicial
systems.
II
THE OBJECTIVES OF THE CONVENTION
A. European Objectives
Continental legal systems traditionally provide for service
of legal documents by a government official or through some other
official channel. This concept derives from the civil law
notion that even at the early stages of the litigation the power of
the sovereign is being exercised and therefore private parties are
not competent to act. 14 The effectiveness of this service de-
pends upon the thoroughness of the official obliged to make ser-
vice.
llPub. L. 88-244; 77 Stat. 775 (1963). See Amram,.supra note 9.
12Amram; Report on the Tenth-Session of the Hague Conference
on Private International Law; 59 AM. J. INTtL L. 87 (1965).
13Ratified by the Senate April 14, 1967.
14Stern, International Judicial Assistance, 14 No. 8 PRAC-
TICAL LAWYER 21 (1968).
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When Europeans wish to make service in the United States they
find no agency of the central government able to help them. Local
American officials seldom perform such activities and are unfamil-
iar with the requirements of the civil law. Therefore, the pri-
mary objective of the Europeans in drafting the Convention was to
obtain an agency of the United States Government capable of
effecting service of documents in the United States.
15
B. United States Objectives
The American lawyer has not had significant difficulties in
making effective service abroad. Liberal statutes, federal and
state, provide a number of alternative ways of making effective
service.16  But the U.S. had definite changes that it wanted to
effect vis a vis the civil law world through the Convention.
Americans have long objected to certain European methods of
service that fail to give the United States defendant notice and
result in default judgments in favor of European plaintiffs.
Notification au parquet has been particularly notorious in this
1 5See Graveson, The 10th Session of the Hague Conference of
Private International Law7T 14 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 528, 538 (1965).
16Forexample, in New York service abroad may be made by any
New York resident authorized to make service within the state, or
by any person authorized to make service by the laws-of the for-
eign state, or by any qualified attorney, or equivalent in the
foreign state. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 313. The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are even more liberal; once it has been established that
service may be made abroad pursuant to an appropriate federal
statute or state rule, service may, in addition, be made under the
law of the foreign country, through-letters rogatory, by personal
delivery by anyone older than 18 who is not a party to the action,
by mail sent by the court and evidenced by a signed-receipt, or
by order of the court. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e) and (i). In Federal
court when service is made abroad under 4(e) and 4(i) pursuant to
a state statute, such as N.Y. C.P.L.R. 313, care must be taken to
see that under the same conditions the state court in whose dis-
trict the federal court sits would have had long-arm jurisdiction
over the defendant. This is particularly important in states
such as New York where the appropriate statute (e.g., N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 302) is not as broad an assertion of jurisdiction as is
constitutionally allowable. Even in federal question cases,
process served outside the federal court's territory pursuant
to a state rule, is valid only if the state court would have had
long-arm jurisdiction. See Gkiafis v. S.S. Yrosonas, 342 F.
2d 546 (4th Cir. 1965).
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regard. Under this system a European plaintiff may serve process
on a local European official. Notification must-be sent to the
defendant but the service is valid even if it never reaches him.
Thus, a European plaintiff can win a default judgment against an
American defendant who had no notice that an action had been in-
stituted against him.1 7 Such a judgment is-easily reopened for
a certain time, generally a year, but after that it is difficult
or impossible to reopen. The United States properly sought to stop
this practice. The United States also gains from the institution
of a governmental organ capable of effecting service of documents
because such service is not open to the objections made by civil
law countries to service by private parties, that the home nation's
sovereignty is encroached upon.
The Convention seeks to satisfy the objectives of the drafters
in three ways: (a) it creates a new and specific governmental
method for service of documents from abroad by each signatory
state; (b) it regulates previous methods of service; and (c) it
regulates the method for obtaining default judgments-when docu-
ments are served abroad. The manner in which the Convention alters
American law and practice will now be examined.
III
METHODS OF SERVICE AFFECTED BY THE CONVENTION
Article 5 dictates that each state signing the Convention must
create a Central Authority that will receive and attempt to satisfy
requests from abroad for service upon persons within their borders.
Article 5 of the Convention explains how the Central Authority is
to make service:
The Central Authority of the State addressed-shall itself
serve the document or shall arrange to have it served
by an appropriate agency, either:
a) by a method prescribed by its internal law for
service of documents in domestic actions upon persons
who are within its territory, or
1 7This situation is exacerbated by the rule in some civil
law jurisdictions that any property of the United States de-
fendant within the forum state gives that state personal juris-
diction over the defendant. See de Vries & Lowenfeld,
Jurisdiction in Personal Actions -- A Comparison of Civil Law
Views, 44 IA. L. REV. 3-O6Ti95-9. --
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b) by a particular method requested by the applicant,
unless such a method is incompatible with the law of
the State addressed.
Subject to sub-paragraph (b) of the first paragraph
of this article, the document may always be served by
delivery to an addressee who accepts'it voluntarily.
After effecting service, the Central Authority must forward
a certificate to the applicant stating that the document was
served, and relating the method, place, date of service, and the
person to whom the document was delivered. If the document was
not served, the certificate shall be returned'to the applicant
explaining the reasons. Costs are born by the'applicant. This
provision is primarily for the benefit of the'Europeans, ensuring
that thae will be a governmental agency in the United States
through which to make service. It also provides'a useful alter-
nate method for Americans who wish to effect service in Europe.
Article 1 of the Convention states that the Convention shall
apply in all civil and commercial cases where there is occasion
to transmit documents abroad. The Convention, through the Su-
premacy clause, supersedes all state and-federal methods of
service abroad, but specifically allows certain prior methods to
remain in force. Article 1 limits the Convention to those cases
in which the defendant's address is known.
Article 8 allows States freedom to use consular channels to
effect sevice upon their own nationals, absolutely, and.upon others,
subject to the limitation that any State may object to such service
within its borders. Article 9 indicates that the Convention does
not intend to effect the present system of letters rogatory.
1 8
Article 19 allows any method of service permitted under the in-
ternal law of the country in which service is made. Article 10
states:
Provided the State of destination does not object, the
present Convention shall not interfere with--
(a) the freedom to send-judicial documents, by postal
channels, directly to persons abroad.
(b) the freedom of judicial officers,'officials or
other competent persons of the State or origin to effect
1 8See Jones, International Judicial Assistance, 62 YALE L.J.
515, 54L315 (1953); Everett, Letters-Rogatory, 44 COLUM. L. REV.72 (1944).
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service of judicial documents directlythrough the ju-
dicial officers, officials or other-competent persons
of the State of destination.
(c) the freedom of any person interested-in a judicial
proceeding to effect service of judicial documents
directly through the judicial officers,-officials or
other competent persons of the State of destination.
Article 10's limitations on tiL scope of the Convention are so
broad that most previous methods of service by Americans on
Europeans may remain in force absent objection'by state of des-
tination. However, there are some prior methods that are no longer
permitted by virtue of Aritcle 1 of the Convention; these methods
of service are no longer valid under American law.
For example, suppose an American party brings suit against
a European party in an American court. Service is made under
Federal Rule 4(i) or New York C.P.L.R. 313 whereby an American
attorney serves the European party directly in Europe. Suppose
further that the European party defaults. The serviqe never
passes through the Central Authority of the European nation as
required in Article 5, and it is not authorized inArticle 10.
However Article 19 allows other methods of service if they are
permitted under the internal law of the foreign country. Unfor-
tunately there is no uniform position in Europe-on most of these
methods. For example Switzerland strongly objects'to foreign
attorneys making service within her borders; Great Britain permits
any attorney to make service;many other countries are silent.
1 9
Thus, a judgment rendered by the American Court may be completely
void under United States law unless the internal law of the foreign
state permits service by an American attorney. Of course if the
1 9 Practice and theory should not be confused here. Con-
tinental European countries traditionally have objected to anyone
other than local officials making service. In practice, however,
many European countries have tolerated foreign methods of making
service, by looking the other way when, for instance, United
States attorneys make service. Such a live and let live attitude
will not satisfy the Convention requirements. Under Article 19 the
American plaintiff must show that the internal law of the foreign
country permits such methods of service. As a practical matter
this would be difficult to affirmatively prove-since, where the
European laws do not specifically prohibit methods-of foreign
service, what laws there are on the subject are few and vague.
Service abroad by an American attorney, then, is a risky method
except in another common law based jurisdiction, such as, Great
Britain.
service is faulty it may be corrected by asking the Central
Authority for permission under Article 5(b)-to make service
through the American attorney. If approved by the Central
Authority, the service would be valid--small consolation if the
statute of limitations has run on the cause-of action.
As another example, suppose that-the-American-party de-
cides instead upon service by a European attorney practi ing in
the country in which the European party is located, as provided
for under Federal Rule 4(i) and N.Y.C.P.L.R. 313, Service cannot
be upheld under Article 5 since it did not pass through the Cen-
tral Authority. However, under Article 10(c) service would be
valid if the attorney is a "competent" person under the laws of
the country in which service is to be made. Thus, the validity
of the service in this case will depend-on the law of the country
in which the European party is located.
An-examination of the law of the European countries re-
veals a wide range of possible definitions of-'tcompetent to serve."20
At one extreme are Switzerland and Austria where local attorneys
are not competent to serve process either for local or foreign
actions. At the other extreme is Great Britain where local attor-
neys are competent to serve process for any type of action, local
or foreign. Between these extremes are Italy and'theNetherlands
where attorneys are specifically heldcompetent'to serve foreign
documents but not to serve local process. France and Sweden hold
local attorneys not competent to serve for local actions but are
silent as to whether local attorneys are competent to serve for-
eign documents. Therefore, to determine who-is-competent to serve,
the law of each country where service is to be made will have to
be examined, often at considerable cost and some risk to the plain-
tiff.
The preceding examples illustrate the problems that the
Convention creates. They by no means illustrate all the present
American methods of service which the Convention may have in-
validated, because it excludes any method not permitted, thereby
2 0The best summary of European.rules on service is H. SMIT,
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN LITIGATION: Europe - Columbia Univ,
School of Law Project on Int'l. Proced. (1964).
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making exhaustive treatment impossible.
It is interesting to note that notification.au:parquet, is
still probably a valid method of-service under the Convention,
providing the state of destination does not object. If a
European plaintiff serves an American defendant-by this method, he
serves an official of his own country and notification is sent
to the American defendant. This raises two questions: (a) Is
this method of service covered by the Convention at all since
service is local and not actually effected abroad?; (b) If this
method is covered by the Convention, is it-absolutely invalidated
by the Convention, or does it come-within the protection of
article 10(a) by the fact that notification is sent to the defen-
dant by mail? As to the first question, R.Ho Graveson states:
The first article of the convention is, perhaps,
the most ambiguous, for it states that the convention
should apply"where there is occasion to transmit a
judicial or extra-judicial document for service abroad."
It is, perhaps, unfortunate that the Convention does
not state more precisely the circumstances to which it
shall apply, especially as one of its principle objects
is to change the practice in which-service-of process
against a defendant abroad can-be made in the court of
the plaintiff's ovm country. [i.e. notification au
parquet]. Can it be said that where this form of-pro-
ceecting is possible "there is occasion" to transmit
process abroad? It is reassuring that the delegates of
certain civil law countries regarded this situation as
one to which the Convention should apply. What is
disquieting is that the contrary argument-could equally
well be sustained, that because a form of proceeding
in respect of defendants abroad already existed there
was in such cases no occasion to transmit documents
for service abroad. It is to be-hoped that those
countries which ratify this convention will apply it
in the liberal spirit in which it is intended.2
The answer to the second question is no more certain than
the first; however, relying on the spirit of the Convention,
notification au parquet would probably be included in article
10(a). The United States has been the leader of the countries
fighting for more liberal procedures in making service. The
United States' objection to notification-au parquet-came not so
much from theoretical consideration of the method itself but from
2 1 See Graveson, The 10th Session of the Hague Conference of
Private International Law7 1T. INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 529 at 539
T9Y65).
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the practical unfairness that results when the method breaks down
and notice for some reason never reaches the defendant. Since
this unfair situation can result only where the European plaintiff
takes a default judgment against the American defendant, it could
be expected that the United States would be generous in allowing
many types of foreign service such as notification au parquet to
exist under the convention by interpreting Article 10 liberally.
In this way they might hope to get more toleration for the United
States' liberal methods of service. However, regarding default
judgments under Article 15, the United States could be expected to




VALID SERVICE OF PROCESS FOR TAKING DEFAULT JUDGMENTS
The first paragraph of Article 15 regulating default judgments
states:
Where a writ of summons or an equivalent document
had to be transmitted abroad for the purpose of service
under the provisions of the present Convention, and
the defendant has not appeared, judgment shall not
be given until it is established that -
(a) the document was served by a method prescribed by
the internal law of the State addressed for the service
of documents in domestic actions upon persons who are
within its territory, or
(b) the document was actually delivered to the defendant
or to his residence by another method provided for by
this Convention,
and that in either of these cases the service or the
delivery was effected in sufficient time to enable the
defendant to defend.
The article is clearly designed to prohibit a party from obtaining
an enforceable default judgment unless a reasonable effort to
effect service has been made and the defendant has had an oppor-
tunity to defend. Under this article an American defendant must
either receive actual notice under 15(b) or be served under Amer-
ican rules as provided for in 15(a). Thus, in either case the
American defendant would be protected from having a default judg-
2 2There is also some question whether any method covered by
Article 10 is "another method [of service] provided for by this
convention" and hence covered by Article 15. See discussion infra
P. 138.
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ment taken without receiving proper notice. Article 15 would at
first also appear to favor the American plaintiff in not further
restricting permissible methods of service. Aside from methods
invalidated by the Convention, virtually all other methods pro-
vided for in America would fit under 15(b). 2 3 It would seem logi-
cal to conclude that in America it would be extremely rare to have
service valid under the Convention, but insufficient to get a
default judgment under Article 15.
A. Limitations When Trying to Serve a Foreign Corporation
Unfortunately, a closer look at Section (b) of the first
paragraph of Article 15 shows that this pleasant picture is clouded
by an ambiguity. The drafters, either intentionally or inad-
vertently, seem to have limited the effect of 15(b) to individual
defendants, excluding corporations and partnerships. Article 15(b)
states that the document must be actually "delivered to the de-
fendant or to his residence,"
Corporations are frequently "deemed a resident" for-the pur-
pose of locating them in a particular jurisdiction. However, the
term "residence" can also mean a "dwelling or lodging." There can
be no doubt that it is this second meaning which is intended in
the Convention. This presents a grave problem since it is diffi-
cult to envision a corporation having a dwelling or lodging. In2!I
In re Kaufmann Alsburg the court held that the place of busi-
ness of a corporation is its "residence" within the meaning of N.Y.
Civil Practice Rule 20 which provided that service of papers may
be made by leaving the papers "at [the party's] residence within
the state with a party of suitable age and discretion." It is
significant however that the only authority relied on in Kaufmann-
Alsburg was Golfbay Country Club, Inc. v. Oceanside Golfer Ass'n.
Inc., 2 5 a case holding that a corporation is located at'its place
2 3Due process does not require actual notice in all cases;
only the best possible method under the circumstances. However,
since this convention is limited to cases in which the defendant's
address is known, it would seem that the best possible method would
require in every case actual notice, and so any permissible
American method of service would satisfy Article 15(b). Mullane
v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1949).
2430 Misc. 2d 1025, 220 N.YS. 2d 151 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
25114 N.Y.S. 2d 175 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
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of business for purposes of a venue statute using the term "resi-
dence."
This ambiguity in the term "residence" is increased.by ref-
erence to the French text of the Convention- which is of equal
authority with the English.2 6 The French text of the first
paragraph of Article 15(b) reads as follows:
(b) ou bien que l'acte a 6t6 effectivement remis au
defendeur ou h sa demeure selon un autre proc4d4 prg-
vu par la t-g'eHte Convention, (Emphasis added)
The term "demeure" means "dwelling or lodging." This would
seem to exclude the possibility of its referring to corporations,
although it is possible that the term might include a corporate
place of business. The ambiguity is almost exactly the same as
that raised by the English term "residence." Probably the infer-
ence is stronger under the French text that corporations are not
included in the term "demeure" because the French use the word
"siege" to describe the place of business-of-corporations; thus,
"siege" is not interchangable with "demeure." The drafters may
have intended to select words sufficiently broad in meaning to
cover both dwelling and principle place of business, but their
choice of words has created a most serious ambiguity.
If the courts interpret 15(b) as applicable to both cor-
porations and individuals, the Convention's default judgment
provision should operate smoothly. However, if the courts say
corporations do not fit within 15(b), the Convention will have
created a series of booby-traps for the unwary practitioner.
1. Traps When a Foreign Corporation is Served Under Article 5(b)
Article 5(b) provides that the Central Authority shall serve
a document by a method requested by the applicant, unless such
service is incompatible with the addressed country's law.
Suppose an American wished to bring suit in America against a
company located in a European Country X. The American sends a
request to the Central Authority in Country X, pursuant to
Article 5(b), requesting that service be made by personal
2 6T.I.A.S. No. 6638, supra note 1.
138
delivery by an official. The Central Authority agrees and in due
course sends back an appropriate certificate that service has been
so effected. Suppose further that, like many European countries,
Courtry X has a law which says local officials may serve docu-
ments for foreign proceedings directly, but for local actions
process must be issued by the court prior to service. The American
plaintiff has now successfully served the European defendant under
Article 5(b). If the defendant fails to appear, plaintiff will
move for a default judgment. The court may deny his motion reason-
ing: "It is true that under Article 5(b) service in this case is
valid, and the action was properly begun. Service was not made
according to Country X domestic law because it did not first
pass through a local court, but service was not incompatible with
Country X law and hence under Article 5(b) service is valid. How-
ever, to get a default judgment under Article 15(a) service must
be made according to the internal domestic law of Country X. Since
the method chosen did not satisfy the internal domestic law of
Country X, the plaintiff has failed to satisfy Article 15(a) and
the motion must be denied."
In the case of individuals,this argument could be met by
saying the certificate from the Central Authority proves actual
delivery, and service was accomplished under the method provided
for in Article 5(b). Therefore, a default judgment is valid
under Article 15(b). But as discussed above, this argument is
difficult to make with respect to corporations because of the
peculiar wording of 15(b). It is possible therefore that the
court would reject the plaintiff's argument.
2. Traps When a Foreign Corporation is Served under Article 10
Suppose instead the American has previously signed an agree-
ment with a European Company whereby the Company agreed to be sued
in America and would receive service by registered mail. The law
of Country X, in which the company is located, does not permit
service by mail. A dispute arises and the American begins an
action in an American court. He sends a registered letter to
effect service on the European Company. The Company defaults.
Once again, the plaintiff's motion for a default judgment may be
denied. Service is valid under Article 10, but because it was
not made pursuant to the internal law of Country X, a default
139
judgment cannot be taken under 15(a) and the court may not accept
the argument that 15(b) applies to corporations.
But here the plaintiff has another argument which is based
on Article 10 overriding Article 15. The plaintiff can argue
Article 15 is limited to those cases in which documents "had to
be transmitted abroad for the purpose of service, under the pro-
visions of the present Convention." But does this include the
methods excluded from the Convention in Article 10? The Conven-
tion was not to "interfere" with these methods. A holding that
in some situations they are no longer sufficient to get a default
judgment is a significant interference. Moreover, such a holding
would create an awkward situation in which service is valid, but
no default judgment can be taken. If no default judgment can be
taken, there is no reason why the defendant should appear;
except for tolling the statute of limitations the service would
be useless. The case cannot be dismissed because service is valid,
but it cannot proceed because the defendant is under no compulsion
to appear. The court should avoid such judicial stalemates if
possible, and here the problem is easily eliminated by a holding
that Article 10 overrides Article 15. Thus, the plaintiff con-
cludes, service by mail suffices for a default judgment even if
the requirements of Article 15 are not met. On the surface this
argument looks substantial but further analysis reveals a strong
rebuttal.
While it is true that a holding that Article 15 overrides
Article 10 creates a judicial stalemate, the stalemate is easily
broken by plaintiff's serving again under the internal domestic
law of Country X. Indeed, the stalemate helps the plaintiff
since it halts the statute of limitations while he corrects his
earlier mistake. But more importantly, if we help the American
plaintiff in this case by saying Article 10 overrides Article 15
we may well hurt American defendants. The plaintiff is in effect
asking the court to hold that because Article 15(b) does not
apply to corporations, default judgments should be allowed
under Article 10. Because of the strict notice requirements
of due process under United States law, any method sanctioned
under Article 10 will almost certainly lead to actual notice where
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the defendants address is known and so the safeguards in Article
15(b) will have been met in spirit. Thus an American plaintiff's
obtaining a default judgment under Article 10 is not unreasonable.
However, if we make such a holding, American defendants will not
be protected against unreasonable methods of service under Article
10 that do not give proper notice. If Article 10 overrides Article
15, then a method such as notification au parquet will be suffi-
cient to obtain a default judgment against Americans. For example,
if a French plaintiff were to serve an American defendant by no-
tification au parquet and no notice ever reached the defendant,
the resulting default might be analysed by the French court as
follows: "We decide that notification au parquet to an American
defendant is a type of service abroad and so comes under the general
provisions of the Convention. Moreover, we hold that it is a type
of service by mail and thus the Convention under Article 10(c)
does not interfere with its effectiveness. We note that Article
15, on default judgments, is limited to those cases where service
is made under the provisions of the present convention, and
Article 10 indicates that the Convention shall not interfere with
the effectiveness of service by mail. We interpret this to mean
that service by mail is not a method of service under the pro-
visions of the present Convention. Therefore Article 15 does not
apply to notification au parquet and therefore this French court
has the power to render a default judgment even though no notice
ever reached the defendant." Such an interpretation would be
disastrous to the United States depriving it of the major points
bargained for at the Conference. It would be even more unfor-
tunate if, in a careless moment, this type of interpretation was
made by an American court.
It is unfortunate that the Convention left an ambiguity in
the relationship between Articles 10 and 15. This is particularly
true because the American courts will probably pass on thb point
only indirectly, This problem will undoubtedly first arise when
a European court must decide whether service by a method like
notification au parquet is sufficient for a default judgment even
though actual delivery was not proved. Hopefully the European
court will hold that Article 15 overrides Article 10.
B. The Limitation of Due Process
At this point an American plaintiff may decide to play it
safe and serve the European corporation under Article 5(a), to
obtain a default judgment under 15(a). Plaintiff thus instructs
the Central Authority to serve the process in accordance with the
internal law of that foreign country. However, the internal law
of the foreign country may be like the law of Belgium, where
process, if mailed, is deemed completed upon the mailing and not
the receipt.2 7 The Central Authority will regard the service as
complete upon the mailing of the letter and will forward the cer-
tificate of service to the American corporation- When the Euro-
pean Corporation fails to appear, the American moves for a default
judgment. The American court will consider the method by which
service was made. It is true that Article 15(a) of the Convention
is satisfied and so as far as the Convention is concerned a de-
fault judgment could be taken. However, the Convention will not
supersede the United States constitutional requirements of due
process. Thus service is open to the attack that it was not the
best possible method under the circumstances and-if proven, a
default judgment would be denied as an unconstitutional violation
of due process of law.
Thus, the4American, to serve with absolute confidence, must
specify the the Central Authority under 5(b) not only a method
provided for in the internal law of the foreign country but also
one known to satisfy the requirements of due process.
CONCLUSION
The Convention marks a significant milestone in international
judicial cooperation and in bringing about respect and toleration
for foreign systems of procedure. However, the need for coopera-
tion will not end with the signing of the Convention. Unless all
paticipating countries avoid strained constructions that play on
ambiguities and interpret the Convention in the light of its clear
objectives, the spirit of cooperation could give way to confusion
and bad feeling. It is hoped that in interpreting the Convention
2 7See H. SMIT supra note 20.
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the courts will go beyond narrow, overly-literal-interpretations
in order to forward its spirit and objectives.
Stephen F. Downs
